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13 September 1963

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*Communist China - USSR: Peiping's latest move in the developing attack on top leaders of the Soviet Union is an open bid for support from anti-Khrushchev elements in the USSR.

The lengthy article defending Stalin, broadcast on 13 September, appears designed to exploit both Russian patriotism and doctrinaire Marxism. The authors--editors of People's Daily and Red Flag--brand Khrushchev's campaign against Stalin since 1956 as the product of "revisionism." They charge that during his attacks he has been "wildly denouncing the Soviet system and state," with the result that the CPSU leaders have become "isolated from the masses."

Although it is unlikely that the Chinese believe this tactic will shake Khrushchev's control, they probably expect a sympathetic response from significant elements in the Soviet party and government.

Peiping's statement also appears to be aimed at militant hard-line factions in Communist parties outside the USSR, on whom the Chinese would count for support at any future world Communist gathering.

The article urges the Russians to turn back from their revisionist course. It is clear, however, that the Chinese hold little hope that Khrushchev will heed this advice.

By defining the ideal le	aders of a revolutionary	
movement in terms careful	ly tailored to fit the Chi-	
nese Party, Peiping puts itself forward as the log-		
ical successor to Moscow.		

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DAILY BRIEF


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*Spain: (Franco may undertake increased efforts to convince the West that his government is moving in a liberal direction. 25X1 Vice President Munoz Grandes will probably soon be assigned the status of a prime minister, with the title of president, and charged with the introduction of "progressive" government policies. These moves would not in fact impair the personal power of General Franco, who would retain the title of chief of state. The US Embassy at Madrid comments that the introduction of 25X1 any significant "progressive" measures would in all probability be cautious and gradual. (Largely to win acceptance by the EEC countries, Madrid has been making strenuous efforts over the past year to give the impression that it is moving rapidly with institutional reforms. A good deal has in fact been accomplished in the economic field, but there have been no significant changes in the political realities in Spain. 25X1

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NATO - Communist Bloc: The six EEC countries are considering a proposal for a common NATO policy on credits to the Sino-Soviet bloc that might avert a credit race among NATO countries. The proposal, which would limit government-guaranteed credits to five years and would require substantial down payments, will probably be introduced soon in NATO's committee of economic advisers. In view of the UK's interest in more trade with the bloc, Ambassador Finletter believes this proposal has a better chance of gaining general acceptance than one setting a ceiling on the over-all credit volume.

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Singapore: Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has announced that general elections will be held in Singapore on 21 September. Lee apparently has timed the elections so as to limit Malaya's opportunities to strengthen his conservative rivals--the Singapore Alliance parties--and to take advantage of disarray within the Communist-dominated Barisan Socialis Party, whose top leaders are in jail. Lee's Peoples' Action Party should win at least a plurality of the 51 seats; his supporters now hold 25 seats.

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Congo (Brazzaville): A demonstration in favor of ousted president Youlou reportedly will be staged in Brazzaville within the next few days. A group of Youlou's fellow tribesmen has circulated handbills calling for his "liberation" from the government's gendarmerie, who now have him in custody. The US Embassy believes that violence may well occur, especially if the demonstrators try to release Youlou, but that the Congolese military would probably support the provisional government.

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Rumania-USSR: The Bucharest regime has moved to identify itself more closely with the nationalism of the Rumanian people and to reduce Russian influence.

Russian-language courses in grades 5 through 11 are no longer mandatory beginning this fall and the "Maxim Gorki" Institute of Russian Language and Literature in Bucharest is being abolished.

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Venezuela: The Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) announced in an open letter to the press on 11 September that it will use violence to enforce a boycott of the forthcoming national elections. This apparently is part of the 90-day "wave of terror" announced by the FALN on 1 September in retaliation for the government's exclusion of Communists and leftist extremists from participation in the elections, due to be held toward the end of the year. The FALN is apparently trying to precipitate a military coup, or failing that, to force Betancourt to shift to repressive measures the FALN can pillory as dictatorial.

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

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